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Role of Law in Preventing them in the Future.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peacekeepers, and peacekeeping, have had a special place in society since the 
time of the Bible,1 and indeed have taken on a new, international dimension since the end 
of World War II and the creation of the United Nations.2 Unfortunately, since the creation 
of the United Nations peacekeepers (U.N. peacekeepers) as a reality of international 
conflict intervention,3 a disparity in how one defines peacekeepers has been created. For 
laymen, Webster’s Dictionary defines “peacekeeping” as “the preserving of peace.”4 For 
lawyers, Black’s Law Dictionary does not define the term outright, but defines the 
concept of “peace” at law as “[a] state of tranquility; freedom from civil disturbance or 
hostility.”5 However, for an increasingly visible number of people living in the areas to 
which U.N. peacekeepers have been deployed, peacekeepers are defined in other terms: 
rapists,6 patrons of prostitutes,7 child pornographers,8 molesters,9 absentee fathers,10
1
 Matthew 5:9.
2 See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1-10 (2001) (describing the 
Allies’ efforts to create and implement a functional international organization, known as the U.N., in the 
wake of their victory in World War II).
3 Id. at 477 – 524 (outlining the administrative and legal governance of U.N. peacekeepers). See also
GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF PEACEKEEPERS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1-3 (describing the recent expansion of the peacekeeping function of the 
U.N. in terms of troops and monetary expenditures).
4 Peacekeeping, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, available at www.m-w.com/peacekeeping (last visited Apr. 
22, 2005). 
5 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 7th ed. 1151.
6 See, e.g.,  Nick Wadhams, U.N. Probes Sex Abuse Allegations in Congo, AP ONLINE REGIONAL – AFRICA
(Nov. 11, 2004), available at 11/22/04 APONLINEAFR 23:46:2.  
7 See, e.g., Wadhams, supra note 6; Leyla Linton, Report: U.N. Troops Exploited Congo Girls, AP ONLINE 
REGIONAL – AFRICA (Jan. 8, 2005) available at 1/18/05 APONLINEAFR 05:11:30.
8 See, e.g., Mark Turner, Call to act over sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers, FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), 
Nov. 18, 2004 at 7.
9 See, e.g., id.
10 See, e.g., Thalif Deen, Politics: U.N. Battles Sexual Abusers in Congo Peacekeeping, ALLAFRICA.COM 
ENGLISH (Mar. 25, 2005) available at 3/25/05 ALLAFRICACOM 15:20:4.
2tormentors,11 spreaders of contagion and disease,12 to name some of the most egregious.
Indeed, the U.N. itself defines the multi-national contingent which it deploys as 
peacekeepers13 to trouble spots across the globe not only as humanitarians, but also as 
“boys,”14 using the idea of “[b]oys will be boys”15 to justify supplying the peacekeepers 
with pouches of condoms along with their uniforms and official status.16
On a basic humanitarian level, the above should shock readers of any nationality 
and profession. To lawyers, however, especially those concerned with international law, 
the above should serve as a wake-up call to the need to change the legal parameters of 
multi-national peacekeeping. American lawyers should be particularly concerned with 
U.N. peacekeeper abuses because of the role of the U.S. in creating the U.N.,17 and the 
close ties between the largely U.S. written U.N. Charter18 and the current, inferential 
concept of the acceptability of peacekeeping which has grown out of it.19
The goal of this paper is not merely to critique the U.N. and its handling of the 
current peacekeeper abuse allegations, as such a critique would only serve half of the 
11 See Edith M. Lederer, U.N. Seeks Police for Congo Peacekeeping, AP ONLINE REGIONAL – AFRICA (Feb. 
2, 2005) available at 2/10/05 APONLINEAFR 02:28:21 (describing the “sexual exploitation” alleged to 
have occurred at the hands of the U.N. peacekeepers in the Congo).
12 See Transcript, Fox News Special Report with Brit Hume, Mar. 2, 2005 (Steve Harrigan reporting) 
(telling, among other things, the story of a woman named Bijou, who contracted HIV/AIDS from a U.N. 
peacekeeper and unwittingly passed the virus on to her husband and baby) (hereinafter FOX NEWS REPORT)
13 See THE SURGE IN U.N. PEACEKEEPING, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/exhibition (last visited Apr. 22, 2005) (detailing the rise in U.N. 
peacekeeping activities and the member states which participate in the multi-national peacekeeping forces). 
14
 Colum Lynch, U.N. Faces More Accusations of Sexual Misconduct; Officials Acknowledge ‘Swamp’ of 
Problems and Pledge Fixes Amid New Allegations in Africa, Haiti, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2005 at A22 
(describing a U.N. official in Cambodia’s response to sexual abuse allegations in Cambodia in 1990 as 
“[b]oys will be boys”).
15 Id.
16
 Tobias Kuhlmann, Educating Peacekeepers about AIDS, U.N. CHRONICLE (Mar. 1, 2004) (explaining the 
condom distribution under the logic of “[w]ith many of them [peacekeepers] young and sexually active, 
often deployed to or from regions with high HIV/AIDS prevalence, and by profession inclined to risky 
behavior, some consider the peacekeepers to be ‘more likely to contract or transmit the virus than the 
average population”).
17 See SCHARF, supra note 2, at 1-10.
18 Id.
19 See infra Part II.
3problem. Rather, this paper will use the past and current understandings of the U.N. 
Charter,20 peacekeeping,21 international law,22 and military justice23 to suggest several 
options for handling both the current allegations facing U.N. peacekeepers, especially 
those in the Congo, and for a fundamental change in the peacekeeping mission, 
apparatus, and law in the future.
Part II of this paper will examine the origins of the concept of peacekeeping. It 
will go beyond the current and past concepts of U.N. peacekeeping to explore the plain 
language of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,24 and the way in which it was originally 
interpreted – namely to substantiate a standing U.N. military force and centralized 
command with no mention of peacekeeping activities per se.25
Part III will discuss the current allegations against U.N. peacekeepers in the 
Congo and elsewhere,26 as well as the vague allusions to decades of peacekeeper abuse 
found in sources from across the world and the political spectrum.27 Also included in this 
Part is the U.N. reaction to the allegations28 and the above mentioned condom 
distribution system in effect for U.N. peacekeepers.29 Finally, this Part will discuss the 
spread of HIV through U.N. peacekeepers30 and the lax testing requirements in place for 
peacekeepers both before and during their active duty.31
20 See infra Part II
21 See infra Part III.
22 See infra Part IV.
23 See infra Part V.
24 See infra Part II.
25 See id.
26 See infra Part III.
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See id.
4Part IV will discuss the current laws in effect regarding peacekeepers.32 Perhaps 
the simplest part of the inquiry, this discussion will illustrate that U.N. peacekeepers are 
essentially shrouded in protection from their home countries.33 The iniquity of this 
system will be examined, looking at the inequality of military justice available against 
peacekeepers based on their country of origin.34 Part IV will then look at the current 
International Criminal Court (ICC) statute35 and discuss why the extension of the ICC 
crimes and procedures to peacekeepers would not be an effective way to ensure either 
prosecution of peacekeepers for individual abuses or eligibility for prosecution at all.36
To set the framework for the discussion in Part VI, this Part will also include a basic 
outline of the sanction power possessed by the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC).37
In contrast to the legal morass presented in Part IV, Part V will describe the 
current status of the United States Code of Military Justice (USCMJ)38 and what 
prosecutions of peacekeepers would be allowed under it.39 A comparison of the 
procedural aspects of a prosecution under the USCMJ and the ICC statute provisions will 
be made as well.40
The culmination of this paper is Part VI, in which the author presents several 
possible options for addressing the current U.N. peacekeeper abuse allegations and for 
32 See infra Part IV.
33 See id.
34 See id.
35 See id.
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 See infra Part V.
39 See id.
40 See id.
5changing peacekeeping in the future.41 It is the author’s belief that, in light of past 
attitudes of U.N. officials towards peacekeeper abuse allegations42 and the current spate 
of corruption allegations plaguing the U.N. and its administration,43 the U.N. is an 
inappropriate organization to handle the peacekeeper abuses. To deal with the immediate 
allegations, the author recommends that the UNSC direct (and send trusted 
representatives to oversee) the creation of secure peacekeeper compounds, as well as 
promulgate rules creating new positions of overseers of peacekeepers who are 
representatives from at least two of the five permanent UNSC members based on their 
relative contribution. The author’s reasoning for this suggestion, outside of the basic 
sense of responsibility for the U.N. forces which is imparted to the permanent members 
of the UNSC under the U.N. Charter,44 is her very strong belief that U.S. taxpayers, who 
are protected by concrete laws regarding such crimes as rape and molestation, would not 
want their money to go towards the further subsidization of peacekeepers who can prey 
on victims without a guaranteed recourse.45 In addition, the author highly advocates the 
use of economic sanctions against any countries which have contributed peacekeepers 
implicated in the abuse and have failed to prosecute, or failed to vigorously prosecute, 
those implicated peacekeepers.46 These sanctions should be followed up by removal of 
the home countries’ currently stationed peacekeepers, and blacklisting of these countries 
for future peacekeeping missions, if vigorous criminal prosecution of the errant 
peacekeepers is not made by the home countries.47
41 See infra Part VI.
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 See id.
6To address the future of peacekeeping, the author then proposes a reading of the 
Chapter VI provisions of the Charter closer to the original interpretation that these 
provisions evince the intent to create a military apparatus attached to the UNSC and 
under its ultimate control and authority.48 This reading would allow for the creation of a 
separate, standing military and peacekeeping force which would be under the joint 
command of at least two of the five permanent UNSC members. While this in and of 
itself is not a new idea, the author then proposes that the recruitment and staffing of this 
force would not come from voluntary participation by U.N. member countries, but rather 
from international recruitment similar to that used by the American military. In this way, 
the peacekeepers would be under the control and law of the force itself and not their 
home countries. Given the many problems with the ICC statute as applied to at least the 
current peacekeeper abuses, the author would further propose that the most compatible 
military laws of the five permanent members (in all likelihood the U.S. and the U.K.) be 
used and applied to the peacekeepers in this force.
The conclusion of this paper, Part VII, restates the problems and suggestions 
discussed and offered throughout the paper. It also expresses the author’s belief that 
peacekeeping as a concept offers many benefits, but that these benefits are outweighed by 
any types of abuses. The problem of the U.N. peacekeepers illustrates that international 
law is flawed in its attempts to create legal consensus throughout the world, with the 
ultimate result being that peacekeepers who prey on those they are assigned to protect are 
not subject to the same justice. In this situation, it is imperative that the countries which 
founded the U.N., particularly the U.S., provide structure to the peacekeepers. Lawyers 
facing conflicts of law issues will ultimately always have to choose one law over the 
48 See infra Part VI.
7other; if this works for commercial transactions then it should certainly work for the 
protection of people.
II. CHAPTER VI AND PEACEKEPING HISTORY
The primary mandate of the U.N. is set out in Chapters V and VII of the 
Charter.49 These provisions make it the stated aim of the UNSC to “maint[ain] . . .  
international peace and security,”50 and to take action when there are perceived threats to 
international peace and/or security.51 A great deal of scholarly work has focused on when 
a threat would rise to the level of endangering either international peace and/or security, 
but, in recent years at least, there has not been as much focus on the military provisions 
of the Charter set out in Chapter VII.52
These provisions are the backbone of the inference that there should be a U.N. 
peacekeeping force established and maintained by the UNSC, however this is only an 
inference.53 A literal reading of the plain language of the Charter leads one to believe that 
49 U.N. CHARTER chs. V, VII. 
50 Id. at ch. V. art. 24.
51 See id. at ch. VII.
52
 The author posits that this dearth of literature is due to the documented trend of interpreting the Chapter 
VII provisions as solely authorizing peacekeeping activities through inferential and, it has been argued, 
practical readings of the Charter. See ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
SECURITY COUNCIL (2004). Concededly, part of the reason for the inability to enforce the literal Chapter 
VII provisions stemmed from the Cold War. Id. However, it is interesting to note that in the wake of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War there was no push to re-evaluate the 
understanding and application of Chapter VII, rather, there has been a push towards more peacekeeping 
activity and missions in the years since the end of the Cold War. See id.; see also TIMELINE OF UNITED
NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1948-2005, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/timeline/pages/timeline.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2005) (documenting 
a dramatic increase in the number of peacekeeping operations undertaken by the U.N. from the mid-
1980s/early 1990s onward); Peacekeeping Resurgence, U.N. CHRONICLE (Mar. 22, 2000).
53 See DE WET, supra note 52 (charting the growth and development of the peacekeeping concept out of 
inferences in the Chapter VII provisions); Q&A – WHAT IS PEACEKEEPING, U.N. PEACEKEEPING, available
at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q1.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2005) (stating that the basis for the 
power to establish and implement peacekeeping operations through the U.N. is because “[t]he Charter of 
the United Nations gives the UN Security Council the power and responsibility to take collective action to 
maintain international peace and security”); Fifty unforeseen years (U.N. peacekeeping operations), U.N. 
CHRONICLE (Sept. 22, 1998) (admitting that the U.N. Charter does not explicitly call for peacekeeping 
8the goal of the framers of the U.N. Charter (which is to say the framers of the U.N. itself)
was to create a standing military body,54 under joint command,55 to serve at the ready if 
necessary to protect that stated mission of the U.N.56 On the heels of World War II, the 
victorious powers had seen their share of war and destruction,57 and certainly 
peacekeeping and stabilization in the wake of war as well, yet the only literal provisions 
in the Charter are for the standing military idea.58 Unfortunately, there are no 
interpretative aids for divining the intent of the drafters of the U.N. Charter with regard to 
these provisions, however it is not a stretch of the imagination to suggest that the intent 
was to create a standing military which would provide a host of services to the U.N. and 
the world population as a whole,59 as a standard national military would do. Using this 
interpretation, peacekeeping would not need to be elaborated or inferred because it is part 
of standard military procedure;60 the corollary to this is that there is no elaboration of a 
operations and positing that “[t]he Security Council presumably paused for detailed deliberation when, in 
1948, it established the first peacekeeping mission, which built on the intent, if not the letter, of its assigned 
responsibility”).
54 U.N. CHARTER ch. VII, art. 47 (“There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and 
assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its 
disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.”). This works in conjunction with the 
article 43 provisions requiring that the members of the UNSC provide military forces and other resources to 
the UNSC for the international peace and security mission. Id. at art. 43.
55 Id. at art. 47 (“The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent 
members of the Security Counsel or their representatives.”).
56 Id. (“The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic 
direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council.”)
57 See generally JOSEPH E. PERSICO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL (1994) (providing details of the 
horrors inflicted on the world by the Nazis who were tried at the Nuremberg tribunal).
58 U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.
59 See id.; see also id. at ch. V (providing the UNSC, and particularly the permanent members of the UNSC 
with the onerous task of the “maintenance of international peace and security”); id. at ch. I (listing, among 
the methods for maintaining international peace and security, “to take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other 
breaches of the peace”). 
60
 For example, part of the current U.S. mission in Iraq is to keep the peace and rebuild the country, 
however there are no specified “peacekeepers” tasked to this purpose; rather, the military itself embraces 
these responsibilities as part of its standard protocol and mission.
9separate peacekeeping force, implying that all services were to be under the auspices of a 
joint command that was to be associated with the UNSC.61
Regardless of how one interprets the actual language of the Charter provisions, 
once the Cold War started it was accepted that the concept of a standing military force 
under a joint command would not be feasible.62 In this climate, the Charter provisions 
were re-examined, and found to infer the idea of a peacekeeping mandate which would 
grow to become the current U.N. peacekeeping force,63 also known colloquially as the 
“blue helmets” due to the color of the uniforms used.64
At present, there are 66, 918 deployed peacekeepers from 103 countries stationed 
in various political and military hot spots throughout the world.65 When conceptualizing 
the makeup of this peacekeeping force many, including the author, initially assume that 
there is some form of obligation on the part of U.N. members to provide troops and 
personnel to serve as peacekeepers. In truth, however, the provision of troops and 
personnel is entirely voluntary on the U.N. member countries,66 which are compensated 
by the U.N. for these troops and services.67 A persistent problem for U.N. members 
61
 At law, there are many methods for the interpretation of statutes, depending on the context and the 
question. Many of these are based on U.S. law and tradition, and therefore would be potentially 
problematic to use when attempting to interpret the U.N. Charter. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILLIP 
P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIAL ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION 
OF PUBLIC POLICY 818 (3d ed. 2001). However, using a textual cannon not based in these laws and 
traditions does not present the same conflict. Therefore, the author bases the analysis of the Chapter VII 
provisions on the interpretative cannon of expressio unis, meaning that “the enumeration of certain things 
in a statute suggests that the legislature had no intent of including things not listed or embraced.” Id. at 824.
62 See DE WET, supra note 52.
63 Id.
64 See Wadhams, supra note 6. 
65 ONGOING PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (Feb. 28, 2005), 
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
66 See Linton, supra note 7. 
67 Q & A – HOW ARE PEACEKEEPERS COMPENSATED?, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q7.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
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which provide troops and services is recouping payment for these provisions.68 The 
troops provided are military personnel within their home countries and, as will be 
discussed further in Part IV, are subject to the jurisdiction of their home countries for 
prosecution should the event occur.69
Over the course of their history, U.N. peacekeepers have served in every 
conceivable situation, and indeed many have lost their lives in the course of peacekeeping 
activities.70 In the spirit of these activities, the U.N. peacekeepers were awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 1988,71 and are honored by the U.N. with a yearly ceremonial day 
of recognition and commendation.72 Perhaps this is the most disturbing contrast given the 
current abuse allegations, as various sources have reported that U.N. peacekeepers have 
been implicated in sexual abuse scandals and activities since their inception.73 As with 
the composition of the peacekeeper missions themselves, these abuse allegations are a 
truly global phenomenon, with new and old allegations coming from Cambodia to the 
68 See generally id. (explaining some instances in which compensation for volunteering peacekeepers has 
been withheld, and the financial hardships developing countries face when they provide volunteer 
peacekeepers to the U.N. and are compensated afterwards).
69 See Linton, supra note 7; Deen, supra note 10 (citing the U.N.’s own report – discussed in greater detail 
below-
[t]here is a . . . presumption that peacekeeping personnel who commit acts of sexual
exploitation and abuse that constitute crimes under generally accepted standards (for
example rape or sexual relations with young children) are not normally subjected to 
criminal prosecution, whether it be by court martial or by trial before a national
criminal court, which would have been the inevitable result has they committed such
acts in their home countries.)
70
 Examples of peacekeeper deaths in action are spread throughout the course of missions over the last 50 
plus years. For detailed statistics, see FATALITIES, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/fatalities (last visited Apr. 22, 2005). For recent incidents of peacekeeper 
deaths in action, see, e.g., DRC president condemns killing of UN peacekeepers, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS
SERVICE (Feb. 26, 2005) (stating that nine peacekeepers were killed in an ambush attack in the Congo).
71 1988: UN Peacekeeping forces: ‘the imperial soldiers’ (Nobel Prize), U.N. CHRONICLE (Sept. 1, 2003).
72 UN Peacekeeping missions best way of ensuring sustainable peace, M2 PRESSWIRE (May 25, 2004).
73 See Linton, supra note 7 (“Charges of sex abuse and other crimes have been lodged against U.N. 
peacekeeping missions around the world for decades. Officials have found it difficult to crack down 
because the United Nations doesn’t want to offend the relatively small number of countries that are willing 
to provide peacekeepers.”). 
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Congo to Haiti to name only a few.74 Indeed, in 2004, only months before the first Congo 
abuse stories started to surface, there was a public admission by a U.N. official that there 
were sexual abuses by peacekeepers assigned to the border area of Ethiopia and Eritrea.75
Thus, the history of the U.N. peacekeepers is one of questionable interpretation 
and activities as well as humanitarian awards and missions. What is most bothersome to 
this author is that the history of the peacekeepers has such a pronounced dichotomy 
between saving people and countries and acting as criminals. No matter how the U.N. 
Charter provisions are interpreted, the wording evinces the idea that some kind of 
security force was necessary to protect the world from the ravages of war and human 
atrocities, and indeed many peacekeepers have given their lives for this goal. However, 
those charged with carrying out the administrative charge created by the Charter have 
failed to protect both the intent of the Charter’s framers and those who find themselves in 
the midst of war and chaos, and have allowed the peacekeepers to become victimizers.
III. ALLEGATIONS, CONTRACEPTIVES, AND HIV/AIDS
The primary abuse allegations addressed in this paper are the sexual abuse 
allegations made against the peacekeepers, as these represent the gravest breach of the 
duty of peacekeepers and represent an utter disregard for the sanctity of human life, 
particularly the lives of young girls. It is important to note, however, that in the days prior 
to the writing of this paper there have been increasing questions regarding the use of 
74
 Victoria Engstrand-Neascu, News Feature: Predators in Congo sometimes wear uniforms, DEUTSCHE-
PRESS AGENTUR (Jan. 11, 2005); Joseph Loconte, The U.N. Sex Scandal, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Jan. 3, 
2005) (citing a history of allegations of peacekeeper abuse in Kosovo, Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone as 
well as the Congo); Peter Moszynski, NGOs in sex for food scandal, NEW AFRICAN (Apr. 1, 2002) 
(identifying that, as early as 2002, reports regarding U.N. peacekeeper abuses of young children were 
surfacing to NGOs such as Save the children in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia).
75
 Cathy Majtenyi, Radio Scripts – Correspondent Report 2-315770, VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS (May 10, 
2004) (explaining that the official admitted to some of these allegations in an effort to undermine public 
complaints from Eritrean officials regarding peacekeeper conduct).
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force by peacekeepers,76 and whether force is used outside of the sanctioned self-defense 
realm.77 This issue highlights the need for a central military law governing peacekeepers 
of all nationalities, as such a system would allow for a more immediate adjudication of 
such allegations and would ensure that those peacekeepers involved would be uniformly 
investigated, and either exonerated or prosecuted under the same legal principles and 
terms.
A. ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE PEACEKEEPERS
A young girl, out gathering coal for her family to use as they try to sustain 
themselves in the middle of a war, encounters a soldier on her errand.78 In seconds she 
goes from coal bringer to rape victim at the hands of the solider, who cavalierly walks 
away from his deed.79 Worse yet, it is possible that this girl could face reprisals from her 
family if she tells them of the crime. Another young girl, roughly the same age as the 
first, prostitutes herself to a man in a uniform.80 She is not a troubled teen, she is not a 
runaway, she is merely trying to get an egg so that her family might have something to 
eat for dinner.81
A young mother looks at her baby unsure of how to provide for it or how it will 
be accepted in her village. The father, a man in a uniform from another country and 
another race, has left and she cannot find him.82 Those who worked with him refuse to 
76 Hemisphere Briefing: Haiti: U.N. peacekeepers accused in dispute, SUN-SENTINEL (FT. LAUDERDALE, 
FL.) (Mar. 6, 2005) (detailing Haitian government officials’ allegations that peacekeepers stationed in Haiti 
inappropriately fired on an unarmed crowd of pro-Aristide protesters).
77 See id.
78
 Transcript, Fox News Special Report with Brit Hume, Fox News (Steve Harrigan reporting) (Mar. 2, 
2005) (hereinafter FOX NEWS 2).
79 Id.
80 See Engstrand-Neascu, supra note 74 (noting that these acts usually take place in local hotel rooms).
81 See id. (explaining that many  young girls in the Congo were enticed into prostitution for a few eggs, 
some bread, or some chocolate).
82 See FOX NEWS REPORT, supra note 12.
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help her or her baby survive, let alone find the father.83 Another mother, just 17 years old, 
looks at her child and her husband in horror as she finds out that the soldier who attacked 
her gave her HIV/AIDS and she, unknowingly, has passed the disease on to her husband 
and newborn child.84
These vignettes might sound as though they are a combination of stories from 
various recent wars and tortured movie plots, however in reality they are the stories of 
many women who have made allegations of various types of sexual abuse against U.N. 
peacekeepers in the Congo. These stories are not uncommon, and indeed typify what the 
U.N. describes as the problem with placing troops like peacekeepers in a wartime setting: 
social upheaval and instability, coupled with the economic position of the peacekeepers, 
creates an environment where peacekeepers can easily prey on those they should be 
protecting.85
The allegations of abuse in the Congo are actually more sordid and distasteful 
than the above vignettes, and implicate not only the peacekeeping forces but also the 
U.N. administration sent to the conflict areas with them.86 An official’s computer files 
were screened and found to contain pornographic images of the official with local 
children.87 The same official was caught in a sting operation started by local authorities in 
which he attempted to engage in sexual activities with a local, very underage girl.88 He 
could not be prosecuted by the local authorities, as he was deemed to fall under the 
83 Id. 
84 Id.
85 See Engstrand-Neascu, supra note 74.
86 See Thomas P. Kilgannon, Outside View: Peacekeepers or Predators?, U.P.I.(Feb. 15, 2005) (noting a 
portion of the U.N.’s Congo investigation report which blames the sexual abuses perpetrated by 
peacekeepers in the Congo in part on “‘the absence of any programs for off-duty peacekeepers’”).
87 Id. (stating that a French official was implicated in an online pedophile operation).
88 Sex! Shocking Sex at the U.N.!, INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY (Feb. 24, 2005), at A13 (explaining that the 
sting operation allowed the Congolese police access to the official’s house, thus allowing them to discover 
that he had taped his activities with children and that he had filmmaking equipment set up in his bedroom).
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peacekeeper exception, and was not prosecuted by his home country for his crimes 
either.89 On the point of age, to date the youngest reported victim of abuse at the hands of 
the peacekeeper was seven years old at the time of the alleged abuse.90 Under the terms 
of peacekeeper protocol before these allegations came to light, peacekeepers were 
forbidden to have relations with anyone who was under 18 years old.91
The Congo allegations were the result of both an internal U.N. investigation92 and 
news exposes by U.S. news programs 20/2093 and Fox News.94 The allegations make 
concrete the stories of victims through these accounts, both in news and on television, 
and it is easier to estimate the types of offenses the peacekeepers are alleged to have 
committed. However, there have been numerous allegations of abuse at other missions 
over the history of the U.N. peacekeeping operations which are not as detailed and 
provide murkier waters for lawyers looking at potential criminal charges.95 Since the 
Congo allegations have surfaced, however, there has been more discussion of the past 
allegations in the media, and indeed an allegation made by a Haitian woman was picked 
up by the media in the days after the initial Congo story broke.96 While the peacekeepers 
89 See generally Kilgannon, supra note 86
90 See FOX NEWS REPORT, supra note 12.
91 See Engstrand-Neascu, supra note 74.
92 See Deen, supra note 10 (explaining that the report, created under the watch of Jordanian Prince Zeid 
Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, a Jordanian representative to the U.N., “says there is a widespread perception that 
peacekeeping personnel, whether military or civilian, who commit acts of sexual exploitation and abuse 
rarely if ever face disciplinary charged for such acts”).
93 See Kilgannon, supra note 86 (crediting the 20/20 investigative team sent to the Congo with uncovering 
many important incidents of peacekeeper misconduct).
94 See FOX NEWS REPORT, supra note 12. Fox News ran a four part series on the U.N. peacekeeper abuse 
allegations.
95 See, e.g., Congress Probes UN Peacekeepers’ Misconduct in Congo, VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS (Mar. 1, 
2005) (citing a top U.N. official as admitting that the allegations of peacekeeper misconduct are not limited 
to the Congo mission); 
96 UN Peacekeepers in Haiti cleared of rape allegations, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE (Feb. 25, 
2005).
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in the Haitian allegation were cleared of rape charges,97 they were nonetheless found to 
have engaged in prostitution with the woman in question,98 which constituted a breach of 
the peacekeeper policies and resulted in the peacekeepers being publicly sent back to 
their home countries.99
B. CONFLICTING MESSAGES
As stated above, the U.N. has maintained a prohibition on sexual relations 
between peacekeepers and locals under the age of 18,100 and does not condone 
peacekeepers engaging in prostitution.101 What the U.N. does condone, and indeed 
accommodate, is easy access to condoms for peacekeepers,102 going so far as to provide 
them with pre-filled pouches when they are being briefed for their mission 
assignments.103 The official reasoning for this program is the health and safety of the 
peacekeepers while they are on their assignments, using the logic that these are typically 
young men, and that “[b]oys will be boys.”
The pouches are accompanied by the distribution of cards detailing how to protect 
oneself from contracting HIV/AIDS;104 these cards are conveniently printed in over 10 
languages for easy understanding.105 These cards have a twofold purpose, the education 
of peacekeepers and the education of those living in the areas to which the peacekeepers 
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 See Engstrand-Neascu, supra note 74.
101 See, e.g., UN peacekeepers in Haiti cleared, supra note 101.
102 See Kuhlmann, supra note 16. Interestingly, the peacekeepers profiled in the Kuhlmann article are those 
bound for Eritrea where, as mentioned above, at least one U.N. official has recently admitted that there 
were instances of sexual abuse involving peacekeepers and local girls. Id.
103 See id.
104 See id.
105 See id.
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are sent.106 Interestingly, despite the attempts to educate the peacekeepers and provide 
them with protection, the U.N. does not require potential peacekeepers to be screened for 
HIV/AIDS before they are sent on peacekeeping missions.107 While HIV/AIDS pre-
screening is standard practice in at least the armed forces of the U.S. and U.K.,108 it is not 
necessarily the standard practice in the other U.N. member countries willing to volunteer 
troops as peacekeepers.109 The lack of pre-deployment screening of peacekeepers by the 
U.N. is particularly disturbing when one notes that in recent years many of the 
peacekeeping missions have been comprised of troops from countries where HIV/AIDS 
infection rates are rising at catastrophic rates,110 and affecting a large portion of the 
population.
However well intentioned the peacekeeper pouches might be, they appear to have 
limited success rates in stopping either the transmission of HIV/AIDS to the local 
populations or the fathering of children with women from the local population.111
Turning to the HIV/AIDS transmission issue, at least one study has charted an alarming 
correlation between the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers from countries with high and 
steadily increasing HIV/AIDS infection rates and an increase in the rates of locals 
infected by HIV/AIDS after the arrival of the peacekeepers.112 The poignant vignette 
above of the new mother discovering that she and her entire family are infected because 
of an act by a U.N. peacekeeper113 is a dreadful example of this trend, and sadly is not a 
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 See Kuhlmann, supra note 16.
109 See id.
110 See id.
111 See FOX NEWS REPORT, supra note 12.
112 Benny Avni, Monitoring HIV in U.N. Peacekeepers, THE NEW YORK SUN, at 7 (Jan. 24, 2005).
113 See FOX NEWS REPORT, supra note 12.
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rare story in the Congo.114 Given the availability of both the empirical evidence and 
human tragedies, the U.N. policy of voluntary HIV/AIDS testing is even more disturbing 
and calls the peacekeeping administration into further question.115
Turning to the local pregnancy issue, there are media accounts and internal 
investigation data to support the conclusion that instances of U.N. peacekeepers fathering 
children with local women, or girls, and then leaving without assuming any parental role 
or financial responsibility are far from rare.116 Not only do these peacekeepers fail to take 
any responsibility or make any financial accommodations for their children, the U.N. 
fails to do either of these as well.117
To conclude this Part, the abuse allegations have done more than undermine the 
U.N. administration and the credibility of the peacekeeping mission. These abuses, 
alleged though they are at present, if true, have taken childhood from countless young 
girls- and in some instances boys- and replaced it with physical and psychological pain 
and torment. Many of these young victims face social ostracism both now and in the 
future as a result of what happened to them.118 The women who have peacekeeper-
fathered children find themselves in much the same predicament, and are forced to 
struggle even more for survival after the arrival of the peacekeepers than before the 
peacekeepers arrived in the area.119 And those who contracted HIV/AIDS from the 
peacekeepers face myriad consequences and problems as a result of their infection. Some, 
like the young woman in the vignette, are faced with the knowledge that they and their 
114 Id. 
115 See Avni, supra note 112.
116 See FOX NEWS REPORT, supra note 12.
117 Id. 
118
‘Exploitation of women by UN peacekeepers in Congo widespread,” THE PRESS TRUST OF INDIA (Jan. 8, 
2005).
119 See id. 
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families are condemned to live with, and likely die from, the disease.120 Others will not 
know that they are ill until their health deteriorates, and could potentially pass on the 
disease further. Still others will know their status and have to try to be productive 
members of their society and hope that they will not be shunned by their families and 
community because of the disease and the way it was contracted, while at the same time 
struggling to find medical treatment if available. None of these scenarios arise out of a 
quest for peace, and all that they do is engender hatred and suffering, undermining the 
concept of the U.N. in general, as well as peacekeeping, and also undermining the 
likelihood that U.N. peacekeepers will be allowed in the area again should they be 
needed. In no way can these abuses be seen as maintaining “international peace and 
security,” and indeed in many ways these abuses are the same as the atrocities which 
were deemed to pose a threat to peace and security occasioning the deployment of the 
peacekeepers in the first place.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PEACKEEPING
A. CURRENT LAW AFFECTING PEACEKEEPERS
Just as peacekeeping missions are manned by troops from around the world, so 
too is the law pertaining to peacekeepers global in its composition. The global quality of 
applicable law is due to the fact that, in such instances as peacekeeper sexual abuses or 
other misconduct, peacekeepers are not subject to the laws of an international body, but 
rather are to be tried, if at all, in their home countries and under the military law of their 
home country.121 The most the U.N. administration can do in such a situation is to strip 
120 See FOX NEWS REPORT, supra note 12
121 See ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (1998).
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the peacekeeper of his position and send him back to his home country.122 Indeed, the 
U.N. itself does not make it a practice to chastise the member countries which send 
abusive peacekeepers because of the fear that it will lose a source of volunteer 
peacekeepers if it offends the sending nation.123
Once in the home country, the peacekeeper is then subject to the military laws of 
his country, which include the use of discretion in the decision of whether to prosecute 
the peacekeeper.124 A problem for both the home country in making its decision 
regarding prosecution and the U.N. administration in evaluating the extensive nature of 
the abuses, is the local language barrier,125 as well as the difficulty of trying a case where 
the victim is in a far away and impoverished nation, and not likely to testify before a 
court even if she could be brought there due to the potential familial and societal reprisals 
and ostracism she could face.126
The problem with the state of the law as it relates to peacekeepers is not limited 
solely to the above, however, as there is also a grave and constant possibility of uneven 
administration of justice against peacekeepers at the same mission, charged with the same 
crimes, who are from different countries which have different military laws or different 
propensities for prosecuting peacekeepers.127 An example from the current Congolese 
abuse allegations is the difference between the fate of a French peacekeeper implicated in 
122 See Linton, supra note 7.
123 See id.
124
 Following the initial U.N. investigation of the Congo mission, it repatriated three men: a French support 
staff member and two Moroccan peacekeepers. Turner, supra note 8. Due to the differences in law and 
public policy between the two countries, however, only the Frenchman was put on trial.
125
 The multi-national quality of the peacekeeping missions, as well as the destitution of many areas where 
peacekeepers are stationed and the very real possibility that the victimized children have not been able to 
attend school and learn a common language with the peacekeepers due to the hostilities in their country can 
easily lead to a language issue.
126 See, e.g., Editorial: Peacekeepers as Abusers, VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS (Dec. 24, 2004) (providing, as 
an example, a twelve year old Congolese girl who is reluctant to tell ever her family what happened to her 
at the hands of a peacekeeper, stating “I didn’t tell my mother because she would beat me”).
127 See generally KNOOPS, supra note 3 (explaining the applicability of current law to U.N. peacekeepers).
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the abuse who went to trial in France when he was returned,128 and two South African
peacekeepers who are still being held, but who have not been tried.129 In addition, 
different national legal systems have different concepts of pre-trial rights and procedure, 
due process and fair trials, and jury use, leading to different outcomes for the same 
crime.130 The author would argue that, to those who created and ran the Nuremburg trials 
as a model of international criminal law, this very fact would be offensive.
Additionally, as soldiers in the national army of their home country prior to their 
peacekeeping assignment, there is a very strong likelihood that peacekeepers are familiar 
with the crimes and punishments used in their military courts. The author further submits 
that this is dangerous in that a peacekeeper from a home country with a nascent military 
and military law, or one who knows that sentences for sexual abuses are relatively light, 
or one who knows that there is a precedent of not prosecuting errant peacekeepers, will 
take comfort in that knowledge and feel less inhibited in his abuses, safe in the 
knowledge that he will not face serious charges at home. If nothing else, this undermines 
international peace and security in already troubled areas, and presents the very prescient 
threat that the local population will be victimized by a peacekeeper with such knowledge.
B. PROBLEMS WITH EXTENDING THE ICC STATUTE TO PEACEKEEPERS
The creation of the current ICC statute has codified many of the serious and yet 
esoteric crimes created at Nuremberg, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity.131
By providing lawyers and litigants with actual definitions of these crimes, including 
128 See ‘Exploitation of women by UN peacekeepers in Congo widespread,’ supra note 126.
129 Id.
130 See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 71-137 (2001) 
(explaining the many substantive and procedural differences in trial rights which had to be reconciled 
between member states in drafting an ICC statute which the majority could agree on).
131 See generally PERSICO, supra note 57 (describing the criminal charges brought against the Nazi regime 
by the Nuremberg prosecutorial staff).
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elements, the ICC statute has both clarified the state of international crimes on a grand 
scale and made the ability to prosecute peacekeepers for abuses essentially non-
existent.132 Doubtless there will be calls to subject U.N. peacekeepers to the jurisdiction 
of the ICC for abuses and do away with the home country military law rule currently in 
place. However, a closer look at the ICC statute reveals that there is a very small 
likelihood of successful prosecution of individual peacekeepers under the statute.133
Further, should a loophole be found, or should the statute be amended to allow for 
individual prosecutions of peacekeeper abuses, the structure of the ICC procedures134 is 
such that the ICC is not the proper place to try the peacekeepers.
As a threshold issue, it is very true that both war crimes and crimes against 
humanity under the ICC include sexual crimes and abuses such as rape.135 This is 
certainly a laudable and appropriate provision, as sexual crimes and abuses are a sad and 
disturbing part of conflicts past and present; the problem is that as much as these 
provisions are a prosecutorial resource for such political actors and their underlings who 
have devised, ordered, and committed such grave crimes as those set forth in the ICC 
statute, these are not generally applicable to the peacekeepers based on the facts available 
at the present time. The problem with these provisions is that they require, if not a 
specific mens rea, at the very least that the actions be part of a larger plan targeted to the 
132 See ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT pt. 2 (1998) (defining the crimes which 
the ICC has the jurisdiction to prosecute).
133 See id. (providing for individual prosecution on crimes which are part of a concerted effort or plan, 
rather than those which are indiscriminately carried out for personal gratification or other non-concerted 
reasons).
134 See id. pts. 4 – 8. (providing the framework of the court apparatus, pre-trial procedure, trial procedure, 
and appellate rights and procedures).
135 See id. pt. 2 art. 8 (b) (xxii) (defining a qualifying offense for a war crime charge as “[c]omitting rape, 
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, . . . enforced sterilization, or any other form of 
sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Convention”); id. pt. 2 art 7 (g) (defining a 
qualifying offense for a crime against humanity charge as “[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity”).
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population in general rather than individuals in it.136 This is more akin to a RICO 
conspiracy charge under U.S. law,137 with the caveat that those being prosecuted all need 
the same mens rea and knowledge predicate of targeting a certain population for harm 
and destruction.138
Under such a provision, in order to be prosecuted peacekeepers would have to be 
found to have been part of a concerted and organized effort to rape or otherwise sexually 
abuse the local population with the goal of harming the population as a whole.139
However widespread the abuses are, it is highly unlikely that there was a specific U.N. 
protocol or plan to perpetrate sexual abuses on the local populations of the mission areas; 
it is also improbable that there was a specific plan in place at the mission level by U.N. 
staffers and administrators to do the same thing. The ICC statute is written in such a way 
that it would appear to turn a blind eye to the abuses because it provides no basis for 
prosecution of peacekeepers for war crimes or crimes against humanity unless the abuses 
were committed as an overall part of a plan to target the local population for abuse,140 and 
it would appear unlikely that any of the U.N administrators, commanders, or staffers 
could be prosecuted for the same reasons.141
136 Id. pt. 2 art. 8 (b) (requiring that a war crime charge occur in a situation of international or, in certain 
circumstances, national conflicts in which international law provisions and expectations apply); id. pt. 2 art. 
7 (limiting the application of the crimes against humanity charge to situations where “any of the following 
acts [including sexual violence]. . . [are] committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”).
137
 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (2000). In contrast with the ICC mens rea and knowledge requirements set out 
in footnote 146, a person can be charged under RICO for acting in concert with others towards an illegal 
goal even if the knowledge of the goal and the other participants is not within the person’s possession. See
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
138 Cf. id. with ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT pt. 2 arts. 7, 8.
139 See ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT pt. 2 arts. 7, 8 (providing the mens rea 
and concerted action requirements, as well as the elements which comprise various crimes of sexual 
violence under the ICC statute).
140 See id.
141 Id.
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Assuming that there is a way to read the ICC statute to allow the prosecution of 
U.N. peacekeepers individually for sexual abuses, or that the statute was amended to give 
the ICC prosecutorial jurisdiction over these cases, there are still several critical 
procedural flaws in the statute. First, not all U.N. member states are signatories of the 
ICC statute, and thus there would be an unequal prosecution of peacekeepers, akin to the 
current situation, if the ICC were used as a venue only for those peacekeepers whose 
home countries were ICC signatories.142 Second, the way that the ICC statute is written 
and construed, the primary power of the court in getting a case to trial lies with the 
Prosecutor, who has much more power than his prosecutorial counterparts in many other 
countries, including U.S. civilian and military courts.143 Such a prosecutorial structure 
creates a situation which is ripe for over-discretion by the Prosecutor, and is even more 
dangerous when one considers that the Prosecutor can be from any country, including the 
home country of the peacekeeper.144 Third, as mentioned in the above section, the ability 
to have victims, or eyewitnesses, come forward to testify is hampered by the language, 
distance, and social gap.145 A corollary to that is that, unlike some adjudicative bodies 
142 See RATIFICATION STATUS OF THE ROME STATUTE, ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp (last visited 
Apr. 22, 2005) (providing a list of countries which have and have not ratified the ICC statute).
143 See ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT pt. 2, art. 15 (allowing the Prosecutor 
ultimate discretion over which cases to bring to the Pre-Trial Chamber). Also, as the Pre-Trial Chamber is 
implicated in the prosecutorial decisions made, the allowance that the Prosecutor can still receive 
information a case which the Pre-Trial Chamber has said it cannot officially investigate (which can be 
argued to be a quasi-investigation in the first place), can be seen to implicate double jeopardy. See id. The 
double jeopardy implication can be seen to arise from the fact that the Pre-Trial Chamber is composed 
solely of judges, which lends an official judicial element to an opinion issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
which is not of the same low-level implication as judges deciding whether to grant arrest warrants. See id. 
pt. 4 art. 39.
144
 The qualifications for election to the Office of Prosecutor are set forth in the ICC statute, as are 
prohibitions against certain activities on the part of the Prosecutor and his staff. Id. pt. 4 art. 42. While there 
are provisions requiring the recusal of the Prosecutor in certain cases, these provisions address current and 
past conflicts, including whether the Prosecutor had dealings with the same case or parties in another court, 
but are silent on shared nationality, ethnicity, or religion as a disqualifying factor. See id. 
145 See supra Part III.
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such as the U.S. military courts,146 the ICC statute does not grant the ICC the ability to 
subpoena or otherwise compel witnesses to testify before the court.147 While the image of 
forcing a young victim in front of a foreign court is not particularly attractive, the 
inability to compel the presence and testimony of witnesses, aide workers, other U.N. 
officials, and peacekeepers, or those who might have learned of the abuses through 
pictures or other descriptions, is a flaw to any prosecution and turns the prosecution into a 
he-said/she-said battle. Add to this the possible inability of young victims to positively 
identify their attacker beyond a reasonable doubt, and peacekeeper prosecutions at the 
ICC seem doomed to an uncertain, and inequitable, outcome under the procedural 
requirements set forth in the ICC statute regardless of their viability under the terms of 
the current crimes and elements codified in the ICC statute.
Ultimately, the ICC is not the proper jurisdiction for prosecution of peacekeepers 
on abuse charges of any type, and particularly sexual abuses. The ICC statute was created 
to codify the tradition of prosecuting those accused of political and military-political 
atrocities which started with the prosecutions at Nuremberg and evolved from that 
146
 10 U.S.C. § 847 (2000) (granting U.S. military courts subpoena power and making the failure or refusal 
to appear in court pursuant to subpoena or other method of requiring personal presence in court “an offense 
against the United States”).
147
 The ICC statute requires that requests for persons, documents, and other information go through the 
member state. ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT pt. 9. There are several problems 
with this. First, if the accused is a resident of a non-signatory state to the ICC statute, or the pertinent 
information is located in a non-signatory state, the ICC statute would not appear to have any force or effect 
to bring the person or thing before the court. See id. Second, although the statute repeatedly mentions that 
the member state “shall” cooperate with requests for the extradition of people and production of 
documents, there is no penalty provision for failing to comply or withholding information from the ICC. 
See id. Third, and most important for the purposes of this paper, is the fact that NGOs, such as the U.N. and 
therefore U.N. peacekeepers acting in that capacity, are not signatories to the ICC statute. See
RATIFICATION STATUS OF THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 152. This would mean that, unless the ICC 
statute were to be amended or revised, the ICC could not ask the U.N. to produce persons, documents, or 
other information; if the ICC did make such a request, there would be no requirement that the U.N. comply.
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point.148 It was not created to try individuals for their separate crimes, apart from their 
complicity in a larger plan to harm or destroy a population.149 Also, it is the author’s 
belief that the ICC was intended to be used as a body for prosecution of internationally 
condemned ideas and beliefs, such as those which emerged from the conflicts in 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as reflected in the crimes and criminal elements codified in the 
ICC statute.150 If this is true, then the prosecution of U.N. peacekeepers at the ICC would 
be inappropriate because the ideas and beliefs espoused by the U.N. vis a vis 
peacekeeping as a whole are not likely to be viewed as morally or legally reprehensible, 
and thus are not within the realm of the intent to try a system, or organization, as well as 
the individual members of it.
V. THE USCMJ AS APPLIED TO ALLEGED PEACEKEEPER OFFENSES
In contrast to the above description of the ICC statute and jurisdiction, were any 
implicated peacekeepers to be Americans (at present this is not the case), they would be 
subject to a well defined and precise trial, both in the elements of the crime itself and the 
trial and prosecution.151
Unlike the ICC, U.S. military courts function to prosecute military personnel in 
all manner of crimes, from those relating to their commands or actions while on duty152 to 
criminal acts involving non-military personnel.153 The system functions to separate 
military personnel from standard civilian justice and govern them according to traditional 
laws regarding combat situations and situations in which U.S. personnel who are 
148 See SCHARF, supra note 2, at 771 – 847 (describing the motivating factors which led to the creation and 
implementation of the ICC statute and the ICC).
149 See ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT pt. 2 arts. 7, 8.
150 See id.
151 See generally 10 U.S.C § 101 et seq. (2000) (providing the text of military law and the USCMJ).
152 See id. § 801 et seq. (codifying the USCMJ, which applies to duty-related violations and conduct as well 
as soldiers’ activities when they are not on duty but are still enlisted in U.S. military service).
153 See id.
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currently serving in the armed forces find themselves.154 The prosecution of a soldier for 
acts amounting to war crimes is not an indictment of the U.S. military, its ideas and goals, 
but rather of the individual, or, in some occasions of a chain of command.155
In terms of prosecuting the alleged sexual abuses by peacekeepers, the USCMJ 
would allow individual prosecution of soldiers for child abuse,156 cruelty and 
maltreatment,157 rape,158 sodomy,159 conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman 
(a crime which could be applied to the abandonment of children fathered in the course of 
peacekeeping),160 and sexual harassment.161 All of these charges are made against the 
154 Id. § 802 (enumerating the many classes of persons subject to the USCMJ, including active duty officers 
and military personnel, reservists, cadets and others training to be officers, retired military personnel still 
receiving some kind of compensation or hospitalization treatment from the U.S. military, those incarcerated 
after a previous court-martial, staffers of various government agencies and organizations who are working 
in conjunction with the military, prisoners of war, persons from political entities other than the U.S. who 
are assigned to U.S. military units abroad (unless these persons are exempted by treaty), to name just a 
few).
155 See generally id. § 801 et seq. (providing the crimes under which persons subject to the USCMJ can be 
charged, as well as the elements necessary for a conviction on these crimes).
156 Id. § 843 (detailing a “child abuse offense” under the USCMJ as “an act that involves sexual or physical 
abuse of a person who has not attained the age of 16 years and constitutes” rape, sodomy, aggravated 
assault, “indecent assault, assault with intent to commit murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, or indecent 
acts or liberties with a child).
157 Id. § 893 (“Any person subject to this chapter who is guilty of cruelty toward, or oppression or 
maltreatment of, any person subject to his orders shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.”). The 
terms of this statute could be applied to peacekeepers on the theory that those in the affected areas to which 
the peacekeepers have been dispatched are “subject to [their] orders” both because of the need for the locals 
to cooperate with the peacekeepers to obtain services and protection from the U.N. and because of the 
ability of the peacekeepers to use force against those who do not follow their orders and are seen as posing 
a threat to the peacekeepers and the peace in general. 
158
 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2000). The definition of rape provided under the statute is very broad, and the 
affirmative provided in the statute  - mistake as to the age of the victim – would not apply to the 
peacekeeping allegations in the Congo because there is a reasonability requirement for the belief that the 
woman involved was of legal age. Id. Given the very young age of the accusers, it is highly unlikely that 
such a defense would be feasible or successful in a court-martial.
159 Id. § 925. Again, this is a very broad statute in terms of the definition of the crime and the degree to 
which the act must have been carried out before a charge can be brought. Id.
160 Id. § 933 (“Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming 
of an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.”).
161 Id. § 1561 (2000). This statute is interesting for the purposes of the peacekeeper discussion for two 
reasons. First, the definition of sexual harassment, while limited to the workplace, could be applied to any 
local women who might have been employed by or in the peacekeeping mission. Id. Second, this statute is 
equally applicable to military personnel and civilians alike, thus providing double protection for any local 
women (or indeed any peacekeeping officials or other personnel) against unwanted attention and advances. 
Id.
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individual,162 and the USCMJ also provides the basis for an accessory after the fact 
prosecution should it be alleged that a member of the peacekeeping staff became aware of 
the abuse after it was committed and yet did nothing to report it or otherwise stop such 
abuses from happening.163 In this way, the USCMJ would allow for fair prosecution of 
the individual, and hold the rest of the mission accountable for knowledge of abuses after 
the fact, while not in any way indicting (whether in fact or implication) the mission and 
idea of the U.S. military as a whole or, by extension, the peacekeeping mission as a 
whole if applied in that context.
Turning to the more procedural aspects as the USCMJ, the accused has the 
knowledge that the prosecuting officer is a member of the military as well, and does not 
have the same all-encompassing powers as an ICC Prosecutor.164 Additionally, the 
USCMJ does not require judicial approval of an investigation before it occurs,165 as is the 
case with the ICC statutory provisions.166 The accused also is given the right to counsel 
who is also a military officer and is versed in the laws of the military itself.167 In terms of 
witness production, the USCMJ specifically allows the military courts to legally require 
162 See id. §§ 843, 920, 925, 933, 1561. The only exception to this is a provision in 10 U.S.C. § 1561, the 
sexual harassment statute, which makes the commanding officer or supervisor guilty of a crime if sexual 
harassment reports are not investigated or ignored, or such behavior is exhibited in front of the 
commanding officer or supervisor and no action is taken. Id. § 1561. However, the statute does specify the 
method in which complaints against an individual are to be handled, and makes it clear that sexual 
harassment is a crime under the USCMJ that is punishable by court-martial. Id.
163 Id. § 878 (“Any person subject to this chapter who, knowing that an offense punishable by this chapter 
has been committed, receives, comforts, or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his 
apprehension, trial, or punishment shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.”).
164 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 830-835 (2000) (providing the requirements of pre-trial procedure in cases which are 
subject to the jurisdiction of a court-martial).
165 See id. Under the USCMJ, a full investigation must be made into the allegations prior to any proceeding 
in front of a military judge. Id. In fact, before a trial can be ordered the investigatory body must clear the 
charges and the results of the investigation with a staff judge advocate. Id. § 834. 
166 See supra Part IV B.
167
 10 U.S.C. § 832 (“The accused shall be advised of the charges against him and of his right to be 
represented at that investigation [where the determination of whether to proceed with a formal charge and 
court-martial request is made] by counsel.”).
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witnesses to appear before the court and testify,168 under threat of prosecution if they do 
not in fact appear.169
The USCMJ and military courts have a long history due to their age and 
continued use throughout U.S. history, and a concise history of cases illustrating the 
above points is not within the scope of this paper. However, it is important to note such a 
history, as it allows prosecution for acts such as the alleged peacekeeper abuses, and thus 
provides both the prosecution and the defense in such a situation with guideposts for trial 
and appeals, as well as with a standard body of law which can be relied on and which is 
not in flux due to the volatile nature of the subject matter and political climate, as could 
be the case with the ICC.170
VI. SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE PEACEKEEPING APPARATUS
The current abuse allegations against U.N. peacekeepers in the Congo present two 
interrelated yet distinct situations which need to be addressed in order to assure that there 
is justice for the unwilling victims of abuse and a legitimate and respected body to assist 
in peacekeeping activities in the future. Each of these situations will be addressed 
separately.
A. SHORT-TERM CHANGES AND SOLUTIONS
The short term goal of the UNSC, particularly the permanent members who gave 
rise to the U.N. in the beginning, must be to provide the victims of abuse with counseling 
and medical assistance, as well as the promise that there will be justice for them. These 
168 Id. § 846 (“Process issued in court-martial cases to compel witnesses to appear and testify and to compel 
the production of other evidence shall be similar to that which courts of the United States having criminal 
jurisdiction may lawfully issue.”).
169 See id. § 847 (making it a violation of the USCMJ to fail to appear or produce evidence when the court-
martial or other military court has subpoenaed the witness or the evidence).
170 See supra Part IV B.
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steps are not only humanitarian gestures, they are indeed necessary to preserve some 
semblance of credibility for the peacekeeping concept and the U.N. as a larger entity.
The provision of counseling and medical assistance to victims is a weighty task 
given the fear and reluctance of victims, especially children, to come forward, and should 
be the task of trained child psychologists and other mental health professionals with 
documented experience. The author suspects that the best candidates for this job would 
be female doctors, as the trauma of seeing male doctors who remind the victims of their 
attackers could be counterproductive to the attempted medical assistance. Counseling and 
medical assistance must also be made available to the families of the victims so they can 
understand the trauma suffered by their family member, and, where appropriate, receive 
medical assistance and treatment themselves. Further, the peacekeepers who fathered 
children with local women must be found if possible through such measures as 
mandatory DNA tests, and made to take care of their children and the women with whom 
they had children. If identification is not possible, lifetime care for these women and 
children should be provided by the U.N. itself. The author proposes that the counseling, 
medical treatment, and palimony be funded by the nations which contributed abusive 
peacekeepers.
It is clear from the evidence that, while the U.N. investigation of the alleged 
abuses was being conducted, further abuses were being committed by peacekeepers in the 
very areas under investigation.171 Not only does this evince both questionable judgment 
and a sense of being above the law on the part of the abusive peacekeepers and members 
of the mission administration, it also implicates the faith one can have in reformation of 
peacekeeping missions without some additional oversight. Therefore, the permanent 
171 UN peacekeepers abused women, claims watchdog, MORNING STAR (Jan. 8, 2005).
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members of the UNSC, or at least two of these members, should send envoys from their 
own military corps to oversee the conduct of the peacekeepers, as well as the creation of 
secured missions where the comings and goings of the peacekeepers would be heavily 
monitored. Evidence from victims indicates that a frequent method of enticing women 
and children to prostitute themselves was with the promise of obtaining payment in food, 
which they would use to feed their starving families.172 With this in mind, the 
peacekeepers should not be allowed to have access to excess food or other supplies, and 
access to facilities where food and other commodities are stored must be under heavy 
surveillance at all times.
Legally, the home countries of abusive peacekeepers must actively prosecute the 
peacekeepers, and the U.N. must repatriate these peacekeepers to their home countries so 
that the prosecutions can start. Although the victims will still be forced to deal with 
uneven justice based on the nationality of their abusers, they must still be given the fullest 
possible justice allowed under the legal system of their abuser. To that end, it is 
imperative that the U.N. release to the public at large the identities of the home countries 
of the abusers, and put pressure on these countries to vigorously prosecute the abusive 
peacekeepers. Indeed, these countries should be subject to economic sanctions and 
removed from eligibility to send any further peacekeepers (as well as forced to recall all 
current peacekeepers) should they fail to prosecute the abusers to the fullest extent 
allowed under their legal systems. While this might sound excessive, countries which are 
heavily dependent on the U.N. and its subsidiary agencies for commercial, infrastructural, 
humanitarian, and other aide are not likely to ignore the threat of a sanction, regardless of 
their past precedents in prosecuting allegedly abusive peacekeepers.
172 See supra Part III A.
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To say that these suggestions are anything more than remedial and stop-gap 
measures would be clearly erroneous, however in the short-term such measures are a 
good option because they validate the rights of the victims and the ideal of the 
preservation of peace and the importance of humanitarian actions and policies upon 
which the U.N., and later the U.N. peacekeeping missions, was founded.
B. LONG TERM APPARATUS CHANGES
Peacekeeping missions in the abstract are a vital expression of the ideas and goals 
of the U.N., and the humanitarianism of its members. The key to the future of 
peacekeeping missions is to re-examine the original provisions of the U.N. Charter before 
the peacekeeping mandate was inferred into the Chapter VI provisions.173 In so doing, the 
theme of a separate military force under the joint command, and ultimate control, of the 
UNSC emerges as the intent of the framers of the Charter.174 Certainly it seems unlikely 
that a separate U.N. military would come to fruition as the fighting force of its member 
states, especially when these member states are frequently those going to war with each 
other and/or committing humanitarian atrocities against groups of people.175 However, it 
is the author’s position that if the concepts of the Charter were combined with the 
inference of a peacekeeping force, there would be a peacekeeping apparatus which would 
be effective, structured, and able to punish and prevent abuses like those seen in the 
Congo.
By creating a joint command premised on the Joint Chiefs of Staff model used by 
the U.S. military, there would be a greater deal of accountability and coordination 
173 See supra Part II.
174 See id.
175
 For example, Iraq was, and still is, a member state of the U.N. Even were there to be general consensus 
regarding the need for force, the possibility of having such a force take action against the member state 
could easily become fractious. 
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between the mission commands. Under this structure, member states would not volunteer 
their soldiers for peacekeeping duty, rather the U.N. military force would actively recruit 
both interested civilians and current military personnel from around the globe to join the 
force. This would require that the recruits forsake the laws of their home country, 
whatever it might be, and agree to be subject to the jurisdiction of the military court for 
the force, thus solving the uneven justice problem and preventing the possibility of 
legally savvy peacekeepers being more likely to commit abuses knowing that they will 
not face severe punishments in their home country’s military court.
In terms of the military law used, as between the laws of the permanent members
of the UNSC the most similar legal systems are those of the U.S. and the U.K., and 
accordingly, for stability and ease of adapting these laws to the force, those should be 
used as the code for the U.N. military force. This would reconcile the issues with the 
current legal status of peacekeepers and the application of the ICC statute to U.N. 
peacekeepers with the guaranteed prosecutorial abilities and procedural benefits found in 
the USCMJ.176 By adopting laws which have cases establishing precedent, the lawyers 
involved in the prosecutions on both sides would have a better knowledge and 
understanding of how to argue their cases, and judges would have a far better 
understanding of how to apply statutory law.
Along with the U.N. military force there would have to be a recruitment and 
screening process for all civilian staff members, and an office specifically for the 
oversight of peacekeeper activities and interaction with the local populations must be 
created and well staffed. This office should be charged with, among other things, 
educating the local community about the proper and improper actions of peacekeepers, 
176 See supra Part V.
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and how and where they should report any instances of inappropriate conduct by the 
peacekeepers. All of these suggestions would rather obviously require funding, which the 
author submits should not go directly through the U.N., especially in the wake of the oil-
for-food scandal.177 Rather, the permanent UNSC members alone should fund the U.N. 
military force with contributions which are commensurate to their contributions as of 
2005. As a corollary, the contributions of each of the permanent UNSC members would 
then be significantly reduced to accommodate the funding of the peacekeeping operation.
Since one of the primary tasks assigned to the permanent UNSC members is the 
maintenance of “international peace and security,” and since this task requires a robust 
peacekeeping and military force, the permanent members’ first financial responsibility 
should be the creation and maintenance of an organized, legally accountable, and morally 
respected U.N. military force.
In terms of the troops themselves, recruits must be carefully screened and vetted 
before they are allowed to become peacekeepers. Key among the screening processes
must be the mandatory taking of an HIV/AIDS test before and during deployment. In the 
event that any fathering issues should arise, pictures of the peacekeepers must be 
maintained on file, and all deployed peacekeepers and accompanying personnel must be 
required to give a DNA sample prior to deployment. Should any peacekeeper alter his 
appearance while deployed or prior to deployment, he should be required to resubmit a 
photograph. These measures do tend to go into some of the private realm which civil 
libertarians, especially in America, tend to hold dear, however, in order to rehabilitate the 
peacekeeping idea and ensure that it can exist in a functional and helpful way, these steps 
177 See Texas businessman indicted in U.N. oil-for-food probe, CNN.COM (Apr. 15, 2005), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/04/14/oilfood.indictment/index.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2005).
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must be taken. The world, and particularly the victims, must be assured that such 
allegations of abuse by peacekeepers do not occur again.
VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, the concept of a U.N. peacekeeping force evolved from a somewhat 
questionable interpretation of the U.N. Charter to both win the Nobel Peace Prize and to
become known for truly abominable sexual abuses of those it was charged with 
protecting. This dichotomy has been in no way helped by the uneven legal fates which 
await abusive peacekeepers when they return to their home countries. The idea of using 
the ICC to prosecute these errant peacekeepers does not provide the victims with a real 
chance at having substantive charges brought against the peacekeeper who abused her, 
and does not provide either the prosecution or the defense adequate procedural and 
fairness safeguards before and during the trial. In contrast with these substantive and 
procedural issues with using the ICC statute stands the USCMJ, a well-established legal 
system which would allow for prosecution of peacekeepers as individuals and which 
contains crimes which fit those allegedly committed by the peacekeepers, while 
guaranteeing procedural adequacy and fairness to the prosecution and the defense in a 
less politically charged atmosphere than the ICC. The USCMJ does not investigate or 
prosecute the ideas of the institution which created and deployed the peacekeepers, rather 
it investigates and prosecutes those peacekeepers who have violated the law. In so doing, 
the individual is brought to justice, while the institution itself can point to the prosecution 
of an errant member as evidence that it too condemns the act and that the act is not a part 
of the value set and goals advanced by the institution. This protects the contributions of 
those members of the institution who truly believe in its goals and have fought and 
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sacrificed for the institution, at the same time that it protects future local populations 
from facing the prospect of allowing in potential predators or not electing to allow in 
peacekeepers who might otherwise save their society.
The suggestions made in this paper aim to reconcile the two elements present in 
international peacekeeping missions, especially where there are problems within the 
mission: humanitarianism and law. One can have humanitarianism and no law and 
generate a system much like the current U.N. peacekeeping system, which is besmirched 
by the horrid allegations of abuse made against peacekeepers, and leaves a legacy of 
uneven justice for victims. One can have law and no humanitarianism and end up with a 
dusty book of statutes sitting in a library, an ancient relic never used because there was 
never sufficient societal interest in the concept to create a peacekeeping force to govern. 
Or, one can combine the two and have a system that benefits humanity not only through 
its acts but also through its assurances of even and fair justice. That is the combination 
which will allow the idea of international peacekeeping to flourish.
